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and the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act, Richard argues that, for the Apology to have any 
meaning beyond 2008, it is important that the Commonwealth deliver on the concrete measures 
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guarantee against further racist polices, both now and in the future. 
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RESPONSE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Richard Mohr 
Indigenous Law Bulletin (2009) 7, 15-18. 
 
[F]orcible removal was an act of genocide contrary to the Convention on 
Genocide ratified by Australia in 1949 [which] specifically includes ‘forcibly 
transferring children of [a] group to another group’ with the intention of destroying 
the group.1 
 
In support of his motion of apology to the Stolen Generations on 13 February 
2008 (‘the Apology’), Prime Minister Rudd used the word ‘responsibility’ four 
times. He explicitly mentioned intergenerational, mutual and national 
responsibility. The word was used once in the motion itself, calling for ‘mutual 
responsibility’. The key theme of the Apology was that ‘we, the parliaments of the 
nation, are ultimately responsible’ for the suffering inflicted by the laws and 
policies of child removal.2 The Coalition’s position on responsibility was stated 
with more candour by Senator Concetta Fieravanti-Wells, who abstained from 
the vote, than by the leader of the opposition. Her concern was that ‘this and 
future generations will be made financially responsible for past and potentially 
current actions towards Indigenous Australia’.3 
 
A year after the Apology, I would like to analyse certain statements and actions 
since the opening of the current Federal Parliament on 12 February 2008 that 
illuminate the notion of responsibility for suffering that is legally inflicted on 
others. In particular, I would like to consider the extent to which laws passed by 
parliaments absolve individual members of a community from responsibility. I will 
consider ‘responsibility’ as a term that potentially carries with it some implications 
for both current and future action. That is, even if it were possible to frame an 
apology within such a limited framework that it would only refer to past actions 
and events, surely the notion of responsibility requires that we consider a 
response, that is to say, how we are to act in the future. 
 
I have chosen to begin my analysis on the day the new Parliament opened, 
which was the day before the Apology speech, because that brings into focus 
that day’s events outside of Parliament, where thousands of people rallied to 
oppose the Northern Territory Emergency Response ('NTER’). Mr Rudd was not 
among the politicians who addressed that rally; his speech the following day, and 
the reactions to it, was notably silent on the question of continuing responsibility 
for the NTER. Senator Fieravanti-Wells, in responding to the Apology, did 
address the issue of ongoing responsibility ‘for past and current actions’, even 
though her primary concern was to avoid it. It seems that her reference to 
‘current actions’ was an indirect reference to the subject of those protests: the 
massive police and military operation the previous Government had mounted in 
the Northern Territory.  
 
The Intervention introduced a series of measures in an atmosphere of moral 
panic in response to the Little Children are Sacred Report (‘the Report’), which 
detailed child abuse within Northern Territory Aboriginal communities. The 
measures included making benefits payments conditional on school attendance, 
medical examination of all Indigenous children in the Territory and compulsory 
acquisition of lands held by Indigenous communities under native title. The 
authors of the Report stated in August 2007 that the Intervention ‘does not 
include acting on any of 97 recommendations they made after a nine-month 
inquiry into the sexual abuse of Indigenous children’. They were ‘devastated’ to 
see ‘the troops roll into the Northern Territory’.4  
 
The further use of military force to combat child abuse, and a return to the 
paternalistic policies of the past, indicates that the policies of forced assimilation, 
dispossession and racial discrimination have returned to Australia. So concerned 
was the previous Government that the Intervention may be found to be racially 
discriminatory that it was exempted from the provisions of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’). It is likely that collective punishment of 
people of a particular race would be found to discriminate on the grounds of 
race.5 Military and para-military responses to allegations of child abuse run 
dangerously close to reviving previous forcible removal policies. 
 
What is notable is that the Labor Party, initially critical of the Intervention, 
ultimately supported it in all legislative points. More than a year into the new 
Government’s parliamentary term, it is notable that it has not modified that policy 
or amended that legislation, despite an earlier commitment to bring it within the 
purview of the RDA. Larissa Behrendt has criticised the Intervention, and asked, 
a year ago, what the Government was going to do after the Apology.6 I would like 
to propose in this analysis that apologising without addressing any of the 
concerns over the Intervention shows not only a lack of commitment or follow 
through, but also betrays some a dangerous lack of attention to the very 
concerns that led to the Apology in the first place. 
Responsibility 
 
Before considering the way in which Mr Rudd dealt with issues of responsibility, I 
will briefly consider some theoretical issues surrounding law and responsibility. A 
traditional view sees law as a technique for attaching responsibility. Scott Veitch 
follows Nicola Lacey in proposing an alternative view of law as a technology of 
social organisation. That is, Veitch considers that law disperses responsibilities to 
such an extent that it becomes a technology for ‘the legitimation of human 
suffering’. Law’s ‘technologies of responsibility’, working within the ‘broader social 
forms of power, also provide some of the major resources through which 
dispersals and disavowals of responsibility in society can occur’. The contrast 
between the isolated post-Enlightenment individual and the dominance of social 
institutions produces a ‘proliferation of irresponsibilities’.7 The result is ‘the 
irresponsible mentality’, fostered in the individual who is buffetted by illusions of 
choice and autonomy, but is, in reality, powerless.8 
 
The historical dimension to this bleak critique traces changes from ancient Greek 
conceptions of responsibility, through to the individualisation of the self-conscious 
‘moral agent’ of the Enlightenment. Veitch transposes these into a post-modern 
world that has been re-populated by ‘a plurality of social systems, and their 
offerings and solutions’. So, if the ancient heroes did not know responsibility 
because they were playthings of fate and the gods, we moderns fail to respond to 
those now well-known responsibilities by being tossed about by social systems. 
But despite the interference of fate and the gods in ancient Greek epics, their 
notion of responsibility was a ‘thick’ one, imputing to the actor the consequences 
of those actions, and bringing with it ‘the obligation to compensate or submit to 
punishment’.9 This is in contrast to the ‘thin’, modern idea of responsibility which, 
Ricoeur proposes, takes no account of the broad issues of moral responsibility, 
relying instead on a narrow conception of legal responsibility. Being responsible 
in a purely legal sense allows us to mitigate our culpability and offset our liability 
through ‘technologies of responsibility’, among which Veitch includes consumer 
economy, administrative decision making, accounting and auditing10 that have 
replaced the ancient gods. This state of dispersed responsibility calls for a 
reassessment of law and ethics. Can we imagine a moral actor who is self-
conscious but not isolated from others?  
 
Desmond Manderson has drawn the distinction between this thin responsibility to 
a generalised other, and the relationship of proximity. He insists that law is based 
in the ethical relationship, the duty of care one owes to a specific ‘other’. The 
arrangements of reciprocity define the boundaries of the self and the other, so 
that the individual is recognised through his or her reciprocal relations, of gift or 
contract.11 Veitch’s critique of law’s role in the allocation of responsibility finds it 
fundamentally compromised by a society of nominally free individuals who are 
disempowered by technologies that disperse responsibilities.  
 
Our responsibilities to others have been mediated by social relations and 
collectivities. We have many of the characteristics of the Enlightenment 
individual: we are self-conscious and we recognise our specificity as persons and 
as legal subjects. Yet, as members of collectivities, we recognise the constraints 
on our actions, that our free will is not absolute. Let us see how this interplay of 
responsibility, moral consciousness and legal technologies plays out in the Rudd 
Government’s apology and subsequent responses. 
 
The Apology  
 
The Apology expressly invokes the responsibility of parliaments to absolve any 
individual of responsibility. As the Prime Minister said: 
We, the parliaments of the nation, are ultimately responsible, not those 
who gave effect to our laws. The problem lay with the laws themselves. 
 
There can be no question of agency in this account: people who implemented 
policies of child removal, even those ‘protectors of natives’ who stand 
condemned by their genocidal statements quoted by Mr Rudd,12 were merely 
‘giving effect’ to laws. There is no opening here for inquiries into individual 
responsibility or culpability, of the sort that motivated South Africa’s or Canada’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.  
 
Mr Rudd did, however, concede that there were certain relevant 
‘intergenerational responsibilities’. He went on from laying the blame on the laws 
to refer to the ‘many blessings [we like other settler societies have received] from 
our ancestors, and therefore we must also be the bearer of their burdens as well.' 
These ancestors and their euphemistically named ‘blessings’ were not so 
remote. Mr Rudd pointed out that the policies of child removal continued into the 
1970s, when some current members of Parliament were first elected, a period 
‘well within the adult memory span of many of us’. Yet the language of 
‘ancestors’ and ‘memory spans’ still manages to deflect responsibility. An ‘adult 
memory span’ presumably refers to events in our adult lives, to a period in which 
we were ‘responsible’ in a legal sense, in which we were electing responsible 
parliamentary representatives, some of whom, as Mr Rudd points out, are still 
sitting in the Parliament.   
 
The Prime Minister referred to another sort of responsibility, that of ‘national 
responsibility’, in support of his proposal to develop bi-partisan policies agreed 
with the opposition. Apart from the fact that this approach was quickly rejected by 
the opposition, it was hardly one likely to inspire confidence among Indigenous 
communities and others concerned to pursue respectful, egalitarian policies, 
given the coalition’s record on Indigenous affairs over its eleven year rule. 
Particularly troubling was the Prime Minister’s choice of words for forming a bi-
partisan approach. We need, he said ‘a kind of war cabinet on parts of 
Indigenous policy’.13 The last time the Labor Party and Coalition had joined 
forces to declare war on Indigenous communities was when they sent the troops 
into the Northern Territory in 2007. 
 
In all the Prime Minister’s rhetoric about the responsibilities of parliaments, the 
agency of laws (‘and not of men’, to paraphrase the rule of law doctrine14) and 
the workings of time to allocate to ‘ancestors’ the ‘blessings’ we settlers have 
received from dispossession of others’ land, one anecdote stands out. It is the 
only point at which Mr Rudd personalised the question of responsibility, apology 
and retribution. In response to his own rhetorical question, ‘Why apologise?’, Mr 
Rudd took six of the total 24 paragraphs of his speech to tell the story of Nanna 
Nungala Fejo, stolen from her family in about 1932.15 It is a characteristically 
appalling story of broken families and inhumanity, in which the agency for ‘giving 
effect to those laws’ is specifically allocated to ‘a truck, two white men and an 
Aboriginal stockman on horseback cracking his stockwhip’. The Prime Minister’s 
punch line should be quoted in detail: 
 
As I left, later on, Nanna Fejo took one of my staff aside, wanting to make sure 
that I was not too hard on the Aboriginal stockman who had hunted those kids 
down all those years ago. The stockman had found her again decades later, this 
time himself to say, “Sorry.” And remarkably, extraordinarily, she had forgiven 
him. 
 
We know nothing of what the white men were doing, though the truck 
presumably did not drive itself; certainly, it is unlikely that the stockman, whip or 
no whip, ‘hunted those kids down’ and put them on the truck all by himself. Mr 
Rudd’s point, of course, is that, even were we to find an agent (and how 
convenient that this one is Aboriginal), he can now be forgiven. Indeed, he 
should be forgiven because Nanna Fejo forgave him and wanted ‘to make sure 
the Prime Minister was ‘not too hard on him’. This is a parable of biblical 
credentials, with sins and sinners, guilt and forgiveness, a scapegoat chosen to 
bear the guilt of a whole community. With this device the whole question of 
agency is dispatched, leaving the field open to parliaments, laws and other 




What, then, are we to make of an apology that pledges never to repeat past 
injustices while failing to respond, to allocate responsibility, or to accept 
responsibility for repetition of such a policy? What are we to make of the pride 
that so many Australians felt in celebrating that apology? The distress and 
outrage felt by many Australians over the previous Government’s failure to 
apologise to the Stolen Generations, and the many spontaneous expressions of 
apology, indicate a widespread sense of collective responsibility. We respond 
when faced with the evidence of the unspeakable suffering of Indigenous people, 
many of them of our own generation. We must assess the adequacy of the 
response. 
 
The impersonality of law and the overarching power of the Parliament can be 
seen, as they are by Veitch, to deprive us of personal responsibility. Yet if ethical 
life is to continue, we must also see ourselves as persons with responsibilities to 
others. Whether we were duped by the law, the parliament, or, like the ancient 
Greeks, by the gods, we must still see the consequences of our actions; ‘good 
intentions’ or institutional imperatives cannot completely absolve us. 
 
Reciprocity, as Ricoeur and Manderson point out, involves recognition of the 
between: this includes the relations between connected persons, persons with a 
continuity of life experience, be that of suffering and loss of family or of active 
participation in removing children. Yet whether or not we individually participated 
in the removal of children, or any of the earlier crimes, we are also connected as 
inhabitants of the same space, a social and a physical space. To recognise that 
one is the beneficiary of the alienation of another’s land, which entailed the 
destruction of many cultures and the denial of their law, is to be disturbed by 
profound doubts about the moral foundation of one’s own culture, law and well-
being. 
 
The Prime Minister’s Apology addressed only the first of the actions proposed by 
the Bringing Them Home report. It is worth stressing that, beyond 
acknowledgment and apology, the report also recommended ‘guarantees against 
repetition, measures of restitution, measures of rehabilitation, and monetary 
compensation.’16 A tort which, as Manderson notes, is at the heart of our 
relationship to the other, cannot simply be swept away by the acceptance of a 
generalised responsibility. That responsibility has consequences for the other, 
which must include redress, allocation of responsibility, and reparations. Not only 
did the Apology fail to address the question of reparations, but the Government’s 
subsequent actions give no confidence that it can – or will – guarantee against 
repetition of genocidal practices.  
 
The Intervention into Aboriginal communities of the Northern Territory continues 
to run that risk of repetition. It does this by overturning land rights, by collective 
punishment of whole communities (exclusively Aboriginal communities) by 
quarantining of income, by sending in contingents of police and soldiers to 
‘combat’ child abuse. If these actions were, indeed, well intended, and were not 
racially discriminatory, then at least they would have to be exposed to the test of 
the RDA. That they are still screened from the operation of that Act indicates a 
complete lack of responsibility taken for their impact on a race of people. On 13 
October 2008, the Minister released the report of the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Review Board. While generally supporting the Intervention 
as a response to a genuine ‘national emergency’, the Review recommended 
improved cooperation with Indigenous communities, making the income 
management scheme voluntary and that all Government actions should ‘respect 
Australia’s human rights obligations and conform with the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975’.17  
 
While apologising for, and making good on, our responsibilities for past wrongs, 
we must also look forward; we must properly comprehend the risk of repeating 
our genocidal past. To continue racist and potentially genocidal policies 
constitutes an ethical betrayal and a refusal of responsibility. We still possess a 
language of responsibility; we must use it to try to recognise how we should 
respond to past injustices and respond ethically and intelligently, rather than with 
blind belligerence to current and future challenges.  
 
Richard Mohr is Senior Lecturer and Director of the Legal Intersections Research Centre, University of 
Wollongong. The final version of this article was completed as a visiting researcher at the Judicial Systems 
Research Institute (IRSIG-CNR), Bologna with the support of the Short Term Mobility program of the 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Italy).  
 
                                            
1
 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Bringing Them Home (1997)  
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/education/bth/community_guide/index.html at 22 April 2008. 
                                                                                                                                  
2
 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Wednesday 13
 
February 2008, 170 (Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister) henceforth ‘Hansard’. 
3
 Sen. Concetta Fieravanti-Wells, quoted Michelle Hoctor, ‘Walkout Explained’, Illawarra Mercury 
(Wollongong), 15 February 2008. 
4
 Lindsay Murdoch and Katharine Murphy, ‘Canberra's NT troop move “devastating”’, The Age 
(Melbourne) 6 August 2007, http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/canberras-nt-troop-move-
devastating/2007/08/05/1186252546287.html at 21 April 2008. 
5
 Desmond Manderson, ‘Not Yet: Aboriginal People and the Deferral of the Rule of Law’ (2008) 
29/30 Arena 219, 243-245. 
6
 Larissa Behrendt, UTS Speaks, 19 March 2008, 
http://www.jumbunna.uts.edu.au/research/pdf/UTSSpeaksLarissa.pdf accessed 18 April 2009. 
7
 Scott Veitch Law and Irresponsibility: On the Legitimation of Human Suffering (2007) 41. 
8
 Ibid 55-6. 
9
 Paul Ricoeur Parcours de la reconnaissance: Trois études (2004) 177. 
10
 Veitch, above note 6, 58. 
11
 Desmond Manderson Proximity, Levinas and the Soul of Law (2006) 183 
12
 "The problem of our half-castes … will quickly be eliminated by the complete disappearance of 
the black race, and the swift submergence of their progeny in the white ..." (Northern Territory 
Protector of Natives, similar to views of the Western Australian Protector of Natives) quoted 
Hansard above n. 2, 169. 
13
 Hansard, above note 2, 172. 
14
 Restated by Blackburn J. in Milirrpum v. Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267. 
15
 Hansard above n. 2, 169. 
16
 HREOC, above note 1, Appendices 9. 
17
 Northern Territory Emergency Response Review Board, Report of the NTER Review Board, 30 
September 2008, Australian Government, Canberra, 12. 
 
